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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PROTECTION FOR
PROBATIONARY TEACHERS' FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS: BEKIARIS v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
A very stringent set of judicial guidelines' guards the First
Amendment freedoms of California public employees2 against abuse
by their employers. In Bekiaris v. Board of Education,' the California
Supreme Court recently extended the administrative and judicial pro-
cedural protections afforded probationary school teachers. Although
this note primarily will discuss the decision's impact in the area of
teaching, it is clear that the decision also applies to other public em-
ployees. 4
The court held in Bekiaris that a probationary teacher5 has a right
to an administrative and judicial hearing to ascertain the true reason
1. See text accompanying notes 59-73 infra.
2. California public employers customarily are designated as either statewide or
local administrative agencies. Those agencies which exercise jurisdiction throughout
the state are known as statewide agencies, whereas "[l]ocal agencies . . . are agencies
having less than statewide jurisdiction. This obviously includes all agencies created by
counties, cities, and other political subdivisions below the state level .... Also
included are agencies created by the state legislature that have limited jurisdiction,
such as county water districts . . . pest control districts . . . school districts . . . and
school boards." W. DEERNG, CAiFoRNu ADMINsmv4nT v MANDAMUS § 5.66 (Cal.
Cont. Educ. Bar 1966) (citations omitted). The judicial guidelines which guard
public employees' First Amendment freedoms apply with equal force to both types of
administrative agency.
3. 6 Cal. 3d 575, 493 P.2d 480, 100 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1972).
4. See note 25 infra.
5. A probationary teacher has been defined as "a certified employee, other
than a substitute or temporary employee, of a given school district, who has not
achieved permanent employee status." Coan, Dismissal of California Probationary
Teachers, 15 HAsTINcs LJ. 284, 287 (1964). In California, the length of probationary
service depends upon the size of the school district. In school districts having 250 or
more students in average daily attendance (ADA), the teacher can be granted perma-
nent status after three complete consecutive school years and re-election to a fourth
year. In school districts with less than 250 ADA, every teacher may be offered a
continuing contract for greater than one year but not exceeding four years. In such
districts, if the teacher completes three complete consecutive school years and is re-
elected to a fourth, the school board may classify the teacher as a permanent em-
ployee or may continue to employ the teacher on a year to year basis. In school dis-
tricts with greater than 60,000 ADA, the school board can grant permanent employee
status after only two complete consecutive school years and re-election to a third year.
CAL. Enuc. CODE §§ 13304-07 (West 1969).
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he was not rehired when he alleges that the reason for his nonrenewal
was that he exercised his constitutional rights.6 This holding appears
to reduce substantially the ability of a local school board to mask un-
constitutional dismissal or nonrenewal decisions behind unjustified
charges.7 Although the possibility that counterfeit grounds might be
used to terminate a public employee has troubled some commentators8
This note is concerned primarily with public school teachers. However, the dis-
tinction between probationary public school teachers and probationary professors at
colleges and universities is not important in the area of First Amendment freedoms.
Hence, a section describing and criticizing two recent United States Supreme Court
decisions which undoubtedly will affect probationary public school teachers in addition
to probationary college and university professors has been included. See text accom-
panying notes 102-45 infra.
6. 6 Cal. 3d at 588-89, 493 P.2d at 487-88, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24.
7. The grounds on which a permanent teacher may be dismissed include im-
moral or unprofessional conduct, dishonesty, incompetency, evident unfitness for serv-
ice, and conviction of a felony. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13403 (West Supp. 1972). Sec-
tion 13443(d) states that a probationary teacher can be dismissed "for cause only
[that] shall relate solely to the welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof .... "
Thus, the absence of specific grounds for the dismissal of a probationary teacher obvi-
ously would permit the use of any of the grounds delineated in section 13403. What
additional grounds arguably might relate "to the welfare of the schools and pupils
thereof" is uncertain.
The term "dismissal" customarily is used to designate the termination of either a
probationary or permanent teacher's contract during the school year, while "nonre-
newal" refers to decisions to not renew a teacher's contract for the following school
year. In some states, the procedures afforded a probationary teacher who is dis-
missed during the school year are equivalent to those required whenever a permanent
teacher is dismissed. See note 95 and accompanying text infra. The California pro-
cedures are unusual because they afford a nonrenewed probationary teacher nearly
as much protection as a dismissed permanent teacher. Compare CAL. EDUC. CODE
§§ 13401-41 with § 13443 (West 1969, Supp. 1972). See note 25 infra.
When the distinction between nonrenewal and dismissal is not significant, "termi-
nation" will be used in this note to indicate the severance of an employment rela-
tionship.
8. "Generally, a community is largely apathetic toward the running of a school,
but communities may become excited over a controversial teacher and demand his re-
moval for reasons which are impermissible, such as political activities." Note, Consti-
tutional Law-Due Process-Fairness of a Hearing Before a School Board on Non-
renewal of a Teacher's Contract, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 354, 360. "The possibility exists
that as a result of community pressures against a teacher for activities which are con-
stitutionally protected, a list of reasons will be drawn up which avoids the constitu-
tional problems. [School] Boards and administrators may be willing to do this in
order to avoid the community agitation over the teacher since the easiest course is to
nonrenew the teacher. The present procedures [in Wisconsin] provide no safeguard
against such abuses, and the only recourse is in the courts." Id. n.24. "If 'no' reason
is sufficient to dismiss a teacher and if a discharge on grounds such as incompetency
or insubordination cannot be reviewed and need not be supported by evidence at a
hearing, then 'no' reasons or an unsubstantiated 'good' reason can be used to mask a
constitutionally impermissible discharge on the grounds of race or religion." Note,
Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment-Public School Teachers Claiming Arbi-
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and two United States Supreme Court Justices, 9 Bekiaris is the first
case in which a state court'" has required an administrative agency to
scrutinize carefully and make findings on the constitutional defenses
raised by one of its employees facing termination charges. By requir-
ing an administrative investigation of asserted constitutional defenses
and further by providing for the independent judicial review of the
administrative decision, Bekiaris adds an important dimension to the
protections which California affords its probationary teachers-pro-
tections already extensive in comparison with those found in other
states."1 California's broadened understanding of the procedural due
process required to protect a probationary teacher's constitutional rights
against covert attacks should encourage judges and legislators in other
states to develop similar procedural safeguards.
This note will review the nature of the controversy from which
the Bekiaris decision arose, the development of the substantive prin-
ciples applicable to the controversy, the pre-Bekiaris failure of Califor-
nia's extensive statutory procedures to provide a forum in which to set-
tle constitutional claims, and the new procedures promulgated by the
California Supreme Court. It will also consider the potential signifi-
cance of the ruling as a precedent for other states, especially in light
of current procedures in those states and two recent United States Su-
preme Court decisions concerning probationary teachers.
The Factual Controversy: Bekiaris v.
Board of Education
Christo Tom Bekiaris, a 1966 college graduate, was first em-
ployed by the Modesto City School District as a probationary teacher
at a local high school in September, 1967. During his initial year of
teaching, Bekiaris wrote letters to the local paper to oppose American
involvement in Vietnam, appeared before the city council to argue
trary Dismissal by School Board Held to Have Presented No Federal Due Process
Issue, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 836, 841-42 (1969).
9. "[The Court] holds that mere assertion by government that exclusion is for
a valid reason forecloses further inquiry. That is, unless the government official is
foolish enough to admit-what he is doing-and few will be so foolish after today's
decision-he may employ 'security requirements' as a blind behind which to dismiss at
will for the most discriminatory of causes." Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 900 (1961) (Brennan, I., dissenting). "When a violation of First
Amendment rights is alleged, the reasons for dismissal or for nonrenewal of an em-
ployment contract must be examined to see if the reasons given are only a cloak for
activity or attitudes protected by the Constitution." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 582 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 109-127
infra.
10. See cases cited note 101 infra for federal decisions which have required ad-
ministrative hearings for nonrenewed probationary teachers.
11. See text accompanying notes 87-97 infra.
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against racially restrictive park ordinances, and attended a nonviolent
demonstration to protest weapons on Armed Forces Day. The first
official evaluation of his teaching at the end of the 1967-68 school
year mentioned these activities but rated his teaching performance as
satisfactory. His performance allegedly deteriorated during his second
year at the high school and school officials gave him notice that he
would not be rehired for the following school year.
In accordance with the procedural protections of the California
Education Code 12 and the California Administrative Procedure Act,1"
Bekiaris requested a hearing and subsequently received an accusation
and notice of hearing. The school board argued at the hearing that
Bekiaris was not suited to continue teaching at the high school14 and
offered two witnesses who supported its contentions. Bekiaris denied
or disagreed with each of these allegatioins and introduced evidence
that the reason behind the decision not to rehire him was that certain
school officials disapproved of his political activities. He presented tes-
timony which alleged that high school officials in September, 1968,
12. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13443 (West Supp. 1972).
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11502-11523 (West 1966). The act establishes pro-
cedures to be followed by state agencies in determining "whether a right, authority,
license or privilege should be revoked, suspended, limited or conditioned ....... Id.
§ 11503. The basic procedural elements are the filing of an accusation, a request for a
hearing by the respondent, notification of the agency of the respondent's defense, a
hearing conducted by a hearing officer provided by the Office of Administrative Pro-
cedure, a record of the hearing, a final decision made by the agency itself, and right to
judicial review of the decision. These procedures, considered together with section
13443 of the Education Code, provide the guarantees generally mentioned by teachers
themselves as optimal due process procedures. See, e.g., Joughin, Academic Due Proc-
ess, 28 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 573 (1963); Report of Committee A on Academic
Freedom and Tenure, Procedural Standards in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty
Appointments, 56 A.A.U.P. BULL. 21 (1970).
14. The accusation served on Bekiaris provided the basis for the board's argu-
ment before the hearing officer and contained the following allegations: persistent
violations of and refusal to obey school regulations and instructions to teachers; failure
to respond to direction to prepare and supply course outline; failure to follow pre-
scribed course of study; lack of proper presentation of course subject matter; teaching
material for "top" class (X) taught at "average" class (Y) level; lecture, or "teacher-
telling" method of teaching, without preparation of students for involvement in
discussion; classes used as platform for presentation of personal views (on subjects
such as use of marijuana, consensual homosexuality as a crime, legal suppression of
"obscenity") instead of taking unbiased and broad approach to develop student in-
quiry; failure to cooperate with department head, supervisor of instruction, fellow
teachers; failure to consult with department head as to new teaching areas and subjects'
inability or refusal to cooperate in "team teaching" program, requiring separation
therefrom; demand for advance notice of, and right to have witness present, at confer-
ences with school administration; and threats to "drag others through the mud" if
school authorities sought his nonrenewal. 6 Cal. 3d at 580-81 n.2, 493 P.2d at 482
n.2, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 18 n.2.
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had asked the County Counsel's office whether a teacher could be
terminated because he had written letters to a newspaper. The counsel
replied that these activities were constitutionally protected as "rights
of free speech," and that the only basis for terminating a teacher was
"the manner in which he taught."'
5
At the hearing, the hearing officer ruled that the motivations of
Bekiaris's superiors in bringing the action against Bekiaris were imma-
terial "providing that the facts are such as would justify that discipli-
nary action."16 He concluded, however, that none of the charges were
adequately supported by the evidence and disapproved the proposal to
not rehire Bekiaris. Nonetheless, the school board voted not to renew
Bekiaris's contract.
17
Bekiaris then petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate
to set aside the board's decision. The trial court denied the writ, hold-
ing that since substantial evidence existed in the record to support the
school board's decision, the record did not sustain Bekiaris's constitu-
tional contentions. Bekiaris appealed to the Court of Appeal for the
Fifth District.18 Relying heavily on Griggs v. Board of Trustees,'9 the
15. Record of the Administrative Hearing Before the Board of Education of the
City of Modesto, State of California Re the Matter of the Determination of Cause
For Not Reemploying Christo Tom Bekiaris at 127. This record is located in the
Clerk's Office of the Stanislaus County court house in Modesto, California.
16. 6 Cal. 3d at 582-83, 493 P.2d at 483, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 19. In commenting
on the question of whether Bekiaris's letters to the local newspaper were protected by
the First Amendment, the hearing officer stated his position graphically: "I don't
think that question is before me .... This may conceivably involve something as
innocuous as to whether there should be bells on cats to protect the birds, and I cannot
see whether it makes any difference whether Mr. Bekiaria is pro-bell or anti-bell insofar
as what kind of teacher he is. That is what we are interested in here, . . .not his
letters." Id. at 583 n.3, 493 P.2d at 484 n.3, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 20 n.3.
17. Id. at 584, 493 P.2d at 484, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 20. According to the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, the hearing officer's power extends only to the degree to
which it is granted by the agency. Thus, the hearing officer has no independent
power, and his function essentially is to "preside at the hearing, rule on the admission
and exclusion of evidence, and advise the agency on matters of law .... " CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 11512(b) (West 1966). A school board may choose to delegate its
functions as fact-finder and decision-maker to the hearing officer. Feist v. Rowe,
3 Cal. App. 3d 404, 421, 83 Cal. Rptr. 465, 476 (1970). This choice obviously was
not exercised by the Modesto school board.
18. Bekiaris and the school board stated their contending positions succinctly in
the briefs filed with the appellate court. Bekiaris stated: "The issue in this appeal is
whether or not an Appellate Court will defer to administrative discretion and ignore
the appellant's contention that the administrator's actual motivation was to silence the
exercise of First Amendment rights. If the Court does indeed defer to administrative
discretion and chooses to accept at face value the respondent's reasons for discharging
the appellant, this will make a shambles of the protections of the Constitution."
Brief for Appellant at 14, Bekiaris v. Board of Educ., 5 Civ. No. 1268 (Ct. App. Cal.,
filed Jan. 14, 1971). The school board responded: "What the appellant teacher
seeks here is a cloak of constitutional protection so impenetrable as to render him
May 19731
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appellate court determined that it was restricted in its review to as-
sessing "whether the board has proceeded without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was any
abuse of discretion."20  Finding no error according to this scope of
review and also deciding that the school board's decision was supported
by substantial evidence in light of the entire record,2 it unanimously
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court ruled that the school
board should have considered Bekiaris's constitutional claims and that
the trial court's failure to do so was reversible error. First, the court
held that when "the teacher seeks to present evidence to show that
he was dismissed for the exercise of constitutional rights whose conse-
quent limitation was not justified by a compelling public interest, that
evidence must be received substantively [by the school board] and a
determination made."22  Second, the court ruled that a "dismissed em-
ployee is entitled to an independent judicial determination of the ulti-
mate question whether . . . he was dismissed for the reasons stated
[or] rather because of official dissatisfaction with his exercise of con-
stitutional rights. ' '21 Since these determinations had not been made
immune from discharge, no matter what grounds are stated and proved. No such spe-
cial immunity is granted to the politically active teacher." Brief for Respondent at 5,
id. The procedures outlined in Bekiaris, if conscientiously followed, would appear to
avoid the problems raised here by both sides. See text accompanying notes 85 & 86
infra.
19. 61 Cal. 2d 93, 389 P.2d 722, 37 Cal. Rptr .194 (1964).
20. Bekiaris v. Board of Educ., 5 Civ. No. 1268 at 5-6 (Ct. App. Cal., filed
Jan. 14, 1971) quoting Griggs v. Board of Trustees, 61 Cal. 2d 93, 96, 389 P.2d 722,
725, 37 Cal. Rptr. 194, 196 (1964).
21. Bekiaris v. Board of Educ., 5 Civ. No. 1268 at 16 (Ct. App. Cal., filed
Jan. 14, 1971).
22. 6 Cal. 3d at 588, 493 P.2d at 487 ,100 Cal. Rptr. at 23 (1972).
23. Id. at 590, 493 P.2d at 487, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (emphasis added). In
California, the decisions of most statewide administrative agencies historically have
been subject to an independent judicial review of the weight of the evidence where the
decision affects an individual's fundamental, vested right. Examples of such rights in-
clude licenses to practice one's trade or profession and the right to receive unemploy-
ment compensation. E.g., Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners, 68 Cal. 2d 67, 435
P.2d 553, 64 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1968); Thomas v. California Emp. Stab. Comm'n, 39
Cal. 2d 501, 247 P.2d 561 (1952); Val Strough Chevrolet Co. v. Bright, 269 Cal. App.
2d 855, 75 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969); Arenstein v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy,
265 Cal. App. 2d 179, 71 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1968); McPherson v. Real Estate Comm'r,
162 Cal. App. 2d 751, 329 P.2d 12 (1958). When the decision of the statewide
agency does not affect a fundamental, vested right, judicial review is limited to a
determination of whether there was substantial evidence to support the agency's deci-
sion. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971);
W. DEERING, supra note 2, at §§ 5.52-.64.
There is a line of cases which holds that a local agency decision is subject only to
a "substantial evidence" judicial review, no matter what type of right is affected.
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in the prior proceedings, the court remanded the case to the Modesto
school board with instructions to make the required findings.2 4
Throughout the past twenty-five years, the courts gradually have
lessened the ability of a government agency to restrict blatantly the con-
stitutional rights of public employees in general, and teachers in par-
ticular. However, even under California's extensive procedures which
existed prior to Bekiris, a public employee's constitutional liberties re-
mained vulnerable to attack because neither the administrative agen-
cies nor the courts were required to examine any proferred constitu-
tional defense as long as there was substantial evidence to support the
employer's stated reasons for termination. Thus, in Bekiaris California
has taken a momentous step towards eliminating covert attacks on the
constitutional freedoms of public employees25 by ensuring them both
Since the question of true motive for the termination of Bekiaris' employment involved
a special constitutional defense necessarily subject to independent judicial scrutiny, the
Bekiaris decision explicitly refused to decide whether the trial court should exercise an
independent review of the evidence when a local agency decision affects a funda-
mental, vested right. 6 Cal. 3d at 591 n.10, 493 P.2d at 490 n.10, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 26
n.10. However, a decision on this point should be forthcoming shortly from the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court. See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n,
100 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1972), hearing granted, L.A. No. 3009, Feb. 17, 1972 (holding the
independent judgment test applied where a local administrative decision affected a
fundamental, vested right).
24. On remand, the school board again decided to terminate Bekiaris, finding
that he was terminated for the reasons originally set out in the accusation and not for
exercising his constitutional rights. Likewise, the superior court concluded that the true
reason Bekiaris was not rehired "was ...his failure as a teacher and not because of
the exercise of his constitutional rights." Bekiaris v. Board of Educ., No. 117614
(Stanislaus Super. Ct., Dec. 27, 1972), notice of appeal filed, February 27, 1973, 5
Civ. No. 2014.
25. It appears that the scope of the holding in Bekiaris is not limited to proba-
tionary teachers. The procedures will apply to terminations involving permanent pub-
lic school employees, especially since the procedural protections afforded them are
similar to those provided probationary teachers. Compare CA.. E uc. CODE §§
13404, 13412-14 with § 13443 (West Supp. 1972).
Bekiaris will also apply to the employees of statewide agencies covered by the
Administrative Procedure Act. Those agencies are enumerated in CAL,. Gov'T CODE
§ 11501 (West Supp. 1972). The court did not restrict the holding to the termina-
tions of probationary teachers, and since the same administrative procedures regulate
the terminations of state employees as well as probationary teachers, it can be safely
inferred that whenever a state employee raises a First Amendment defense, the Beki-
aris procedures apply. The opinion fails to indicate whether the procedures it outlined
must be followed by local agencies, but there is no reason why the Bekiaris rationale
should not extend to the constitutional defenses raised by local as well as state em-
ployees.
In terms of judicial review, the holding certainly applies with equal force to state
and local employees. Two statements in particular support this conclusion. First, the
court held "that a dismissed public employee is entitled to a judicial determination of
the true reasons for his dismissal when he presents evidence tending to show that he
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an administrative and a judicial review of their constitutional defenses
when they are threatened with termination.
Before reviewing in greater detail the procedural protections out-
lined by the California Supreme Court in Bekiaris, it may be helpful
to trace briefly the development of the constitutional protections af-
forded public employees' civil liberties.
The General Constitutional Protection Afforded
Public Employees' and Teachers' Civil
Liberties in California
For many decades, a government employee risked his job if he
chose to exercise his First Amendment rights. Under what was known
as the "privilege doctrine," a government agency could terminate a
public employee even when the stated reason for termination was the
employer's disapproval of the employee's political activities. The doc-
trine's identifying symbol was Justice Holmes's ninety-year-old epigram
that "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. '26  The doctrine
was based upon a supposed right-privilege dichotomy: because a per-
son has no right to government employment, it was thought that the
"privilege" of working as a civil servant could be conditioned upon
the employee's surrendering certain constitutional rights.2" The courts
was dismissed for the exercise of constitutional rights whose consequent limitation was
not justified by a compelling public interest." 6 Cal. 3d at 592, 493 P.2d at 490,
100 Cal. Rptr. at 26 (emphasis added). Second, the court declared that "the question
of the true motive for dismissal is a special constitutional defense necessarily subject to
independent scrutiny by the courts." Id. at 591 n.10, 493 P.2d at 490 n.10, 100 Cal.
Rptr. at 26 n.10. Neither of these statements conditions the right to an independent
judicial review upon whether the administrative process is statewide or local.
26. McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517
(1892). Justice Holmes further observed: "There are few employments for hire in
which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free speech, as
well as idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as
he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him. On the same principle,
the city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its con-
trol." Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18. Thus, Holmes never posited that a governmental
agency could dismiss employees for any reason. While he believed that the conditions
placed upon employment had to be "reasonable," most cases in the privilege doctrine
tradition seemingly presumed the reasonableness of governmental action. See W.
HART, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 28-29 (1961). The
controversy continues over what conditions currently fall within the elusive category of
reasonableness. See notes 32 & 35 infra.
27. In the famous Scopes "Monkey Trial," petitioner Scopes argued that the
criminal statute under which he was convicted for teaching the theory of evolution was
unconstitutionally vague. The court replied: "The plaintiff in error .. . was under
contract with the State to work in an institution of the State. He had no right or
privilege to serve the State except upon such terms as the State prescribed. His
1234 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
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have slowly eroded this doctrine,2 and recently the United States Su-
preme Court explicitly overruled the right-privilege dichotomy.29
Hence, decisions by both the United States Supreme Court and Califor-
nia courts now recognize that the First Amendment right of public
employees, including school teachers, cannot be circumscribed more
than is necessary to maintain job efficiency.
Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court's most important discussion of the extent to
which a government employer may limit a public employee's political
activities is United Public Workers v. Mitchell,"0 decided in 1947.
Poole, the petitioner in Mitchell, was a government worker who served
as a local political party official in his off-duty hours. On election
day he also worked at the polls and acted as a paymaster for other
party workers. Poole admitted that his political activities violated the
Hatch Act31 interdiction of federal employees engaging in political ac-
tivity, but he sought a declaratory judgment that the act was uncon-
stitutional.
The Court rejected Poole's argument that his political activities
did not interefere with his job as a roller in the mint and held that
his election activity properly subjected him to disciplinary action un-
der the act. Although recognizing the petitioner's contention that the
Constitution limits the extent to which Congress may regulate a federal
employee's conduct,32 the Court asserted that the Congressional bans
liberty, his privilege, his immunity to teach and proclaim the theory of evolution, else-
where than in the service of the State, was in no wise touched by this law." Scopes v.
State, 154 Tenn. 105, 111, 289 S.W. 363, 364 (1927). See also Bailey v. Richardson,
182 F.2d 46 (1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). See gen-
erally Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HRA-v. L. Rnv. 1595 (1960).
28. The best description of this erosion is contained in Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 H.Av. L. REv.
1439 (1968). Van Alstyne delineated five approaches the courts have used to cir-
cumvent the right-privilege distinction in cases involving public employees' constitu-
tional rights: the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, recognition of the "uncon-
stitutional effect" of a regulation, procedural due process, equal protection, and bills
of attainder.
29. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) citing Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969); and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404
(1963). These cases involved state welfare payments and a driver's license suspen-
sion, but the Court's decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972),
makes clear that the right-privilege dichotomy is now rejected in the area of public
employment as well.
30. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1966).
32. "Appellants urge that federal employees are protected by the Bill of Rights
and that Congress may not 'enact a regulation providing that no Republican, Jew or
May 1973]
on partisan political activity were justified since they promoted the ad-
ministration and efficiency of the public service. "[T]his Court must
balance the extent of the guarantees of freedom against a congressional
enactment to protect a democratic society against the supposed evil of
political partisanship by classified employees of government. ' 3  The
Court added: "Evidently what Congress feared was the cumulative ef-
fect on employee morale of political activity by all employees who could
be induced to participate actively."34
The basic right of a government agency to restrict the political
activities of public employees remains intact twenty-five years after the
Mitchell decision. However, the courts gradually have moved from
Mitchell's one-sided position favoring the power of the government to
restrict the constitutional liberties of its employees to a position afford-
ing greater protection to the constitutional liberties of public employees,
and recently the Mitchell rationale was challenged successfully. 5
Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal employee shall attend
Mass or take any active part in missionary work'. None would deny such limitations
on congressional power but, because there are some limitations, it does not follow that
a prohibition against acting as ward leader or worker at the polls is invalid." 330
U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
33. Id. at 96.
34. Id. at 101.
35. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 346 F.
Supp. 578 (D.D.C. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3324 (Dec. 12, 1972). The
majority of the three-judge district court held that the "least restrictive alternative
test" should be used to evaluate the Hatch Act rather than the "rational basis" test
used in Mitchell. 346 F. Supp. at 585. That is, the Hatch Act's provisions for re-
moving or suspending federal employees as a penalty for taking active roles in political
campaigns should be scrutinized in terms of whether Congress could regulate the
federal civil service by means of less restrictive legislation, rather than in terms of
whether there was any rational basis for the means which Congress adopted in the
Hatch Act. Stating that the Hatch Act did not meet the least restrictive alternative
test, and that the federal civil service has increased greatly in size and efficiency since
the Mitchell decision in 1947, the court said the Mitchell rationale had been "out-
moded by passage of time." Id. This approach was foreshadowed by Justice Black's
dissent in Mitchell: "Certainly laws which restrict the liberties guaranteed by the
First Amendment should be narrowly drawn to meet the evil aimed at and to affect
only the minimum number of people imperatively necessary to prevent a grave and
immediate danger to the public." 330 U.S. 75, 110 (1947). Contra, Broadrick v.
State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Personnel Bd., 338 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Okla. 1972), prob.
juris. noted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3324 (Dec. 12, 1972). In Broadrick, the three-judge panel
upheld the validity of a state statute which prohibited state civil servants from par-
ticipating in partisan political campaigns, stating: "We find that a government's inter-
est in avoiding the danger of having promotions and discharges of civil servants moti-
vated by political ramifications rather than merit is highly desirable. This interest
is of such an importance that it may properly be classified as a compelling govern-
mental interest, and a showing of a compelling governmental interest is sufficient to
justify some encroachment upon an individual's first amendment rights." 338 F. Supp.
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The gradual progression toward fortifying the protection of pub-
lic employees' First Amendment rights is well illustrated in the area
of teaching. In Adler v. Board of Education,38 the Supreme Court
upheld a section of the New York Civil Service Law known as the
"Feinberg Law" which provided for the dismissal of any person ad-
vocating the overthrow of the United States government by unlawful
means or who, after notice and hearing, was found to belong to an
organization advocating the overthrow of the government. The Court
rejected the appellants' objection that the law violated the First Amend-
ment and, citing Mitchell, the Court observed:
Persons have the right under our law to assemble, speak, think
and believe as they will. . . . It is equally clear that they have
no right to work for the State in the school system on their own
terms . . . . They may work for the school system upon the
reasonable terms laid down by the proper authorities of New
York. If they do not choose to work on such terms, they are at
liberty to go elsewhere. . . . Such persons are or may be de-
nied, under the statutes in question, the privilege of working for
the school system of the State of New York. .... .7
The majority of the Court considered the conditions of employ-
ment reasonable since they imposed only insignificant limitations on
the teacher's First Amendment freedoms. The majority reasoned that
the teachers had "chosen" to work for the school system and that since
the law only prevented a civil servant from joining a relatively few orga-
nizations, the teacher's constitutional rights to freedom of speech and
assembly had been only remotely restricted .
3
The analysis that the teacher chose a teaching career and conse-
quently chose to have her personal freedoms restricted was contested
by Justice Douglas who argued that the Feinberg Law was unconstitu-
tional: "So long as she [the teacher] is a law-abiding citizen, so long
as her performance within the public school system meets professional
standards, her private life, her political philosophy, her social creed
should not be the cause of reprisals against her."3 9
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,4" a university professor had invoked
the First Amendment in refusing to provide information to the New
Hampshire attorney general about a lecture he had given at the Uni-
versity of New Hampshire and the New Hampshire Progressive Party's
at 716. The fact that the Supreme Court has granted appeals in these two cases may
mean that these conflicting approaches to balancing public employees' First Amendment
freedoms against purported civil service efficiency will be reconciled in the near future.
36. 343 U.S. 485 (1952).
37. Id. at 492 (citations omitted).
38. Id. at 493.
39. Id. at 511 (Douglas, I., dissenting).
40. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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activities and membership. In a plurality opinion, Chief Justice War-
ren held that the interrogation of the petitioner by the state served no
valid state interest and that his contempt conviction for refusing to ani-
swer violated the due process clause. The Chief Justice indicated by
dicta that Sweezy's First Amendment liberties were infringed. 4' Jus-
tice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan, concurred. They did not
find any imminent threat to New Hampshire posed by the state's Pro-
gressive Party. Thus, the interrogation of Sweezy's "political loyalties"
constituted an encroachment on his right to privacy of political thought
and action as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
42
In contrast to the Sweezy holding, Barenblatt v. United States
43
demonstrated the priority afforded the government's interest when a
majority of the Court considered serious a threat to governmental secur-
ity. Barenblatt, a former graduate student and teaching fellow at the
University of Michigan, was convicted of a misdemeanor, fined, and
jailed six months for refusing to testify before the House Committee
on Un-American Activities about his campus political activities. He
asserted to the Committee that the First, Ninth, and Tenth Amend-
ments protected him from being compelled to answer questions about
his possible connections with the Communist Party. In an opinion
written by Justice Harlan, the five man majority distinguished Sweezy
and held that the petitioner had no constitutionally protected right
not to testify because the danger to national security posed by the Com-
munist Party was thought significantly greater than the danger posed
to New Hampshire by that state's Progressive Party.4 4 Justice Black's
vigorous dissent excoriated the activites of HUAC and the majority's
views on the First Amendment: "[U]nless we . . .once again accept
the notion that the Bill of Rights means what it says and that this
Court must enforce that meaning, I am of the opinion that our great
charter of liberty will be more honored in the breach than in the ob-
servance."
45
Warren Court Decisions in the 1960's
Three major opinions dealing with the First Amendment rights
of teachers during the Warren Court years of 1960's illustrate that
a majority of the Court by then had adopted the view of Justice Black's
41. Id. at 250-51, 254.
42. Id. at 265, 267. Justices Clark and Burton dissented, stating that they
would have balanced in favor of the "[s]tate's interest in investigating subversive ac-
tivities for the protection of its citizens [over] the protection of Sweezy ...... Id. at
270. Justice Whittaker took no part in the decision of the case.
43. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
44. Id. at 109, 129.
45. Id. at 143-44.
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Barenblatt dissent. Shelton v. Tucker,46 decided in 1960, invalidated
an Arkansas statute which required each public school teacher to sub-
mit annually a list of every organization "to which he has belonged
or contributed for the preceding five years." 47  Holding the statute
fatally overdrawn, the Court said that "less drastic means"'4 8 must
be used to protect the state's legitimate interest in the "fitness and
competency of its teachers." 4
Seven years later, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,50 the Court
effectively overturned the Adler"1 decision and held the Feinberg Law
unconstitutional. The petitioners, refusing to abide by the Feinberg
Law's loyalty oath requirements, alleged that the law was vague and
overly broad. A majority of the Court agreed and declared that the
law's uncertain terms and overall complexity had resulted in a "highly
efficient in terrorem mechanism15 2 which had cast a "pall of ortho-
doxy"53 over the classroom. In addition to invalidating the Feinberg
Law for vagueness, the Court also held that loyalty oath program was
unconstitutional because it proscribed "mere knowing membership" in
a subversive organization without the additional requirements of active
membership and of specific intent to accomplish the unlawful goals
of the subversive organization.54
In the following term the Court decided Pickering v. Board of
Education,55 where an Illinois permanent school teacher had been dis-
missed for writing a letter to a local newspaper in which he criticized
the use of relatively large amounts of school funds for athletic pro-
grams and complained that local taxpayers had received insufficient
information on the need for increased taxes. The school board charged
Pickering with making false statements and with conduct which tended
"to foment 'controversy, conflict and dissension' among teachers, ad-
ministrators, the Board of Education, and the residents of the dis-
46. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
47. Id. at 480.
48. Id. at 488.
49. Id. at 490. The Court further declared that the restriction of personal
liberties must proceed carefully, especially when there are absolutely no procedural
safeguards in the institutional processes. This was the situation in Arkansas where
there was no tenure system and all teachers were subject to termination without formal
charges, a hearing, or any opportunity to communicate with school officials about their
termination. Arkansas now requires that a teacher facing termination be provided
both reasons and a hearing if the teacher so requests. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1245,
1246 (Supp. 1971).
50. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
51. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
52. 385 U.S. 589, 601.
53. Id. at 603.
54. Id. at 609-10; accord, Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
55. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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trict."5 6  At his dismissal hearing before the school board, Pickering
alleged that his First Amendment rights had been violated. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court upheld the dismissal after determining that Pick-
ering had actually made false statements, but it did not determine
whether the statements had affected orderly school administration.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the dismissal was reversed be-
cause the record did not indicate any relationship between Pickering's
letters and the efficient functioning of the educational system. The
Court acknowledged the need "to arrive at a balance between the inter-
ests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employ-
ees."57  Thus, Pickering signifies that the balance must be struck in
favor of the teacher whenever the state fails to prove that the teacher's
conduct has impaired institutional efficiency. 8
These cases indicate a trend toward greater judicial concern for
the teacher's personal liberties. Courts will tolerate governmental
restriction of a teacher's First Amendment freedoms only where the
government can demonstrate that the activities sought to be restricted
would, if unchecked, impair the job performance of the teacher and
the efficient functioning of the school system.
California Decisions
The California decisions which involve the First Amendment right
56. Id. at 567.
57. Id. at 568.
58. Another Warren Court case decided in the area of education and the First
Amendment was Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), which in-
volved students who were dismissed from school for wearing black arm bands protest-
ing the Vietnam War. The Court held that the students' dismissals abridged their
rights of free speech. Two well-known quotations indicate the Court's rationale:
"First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506. "Certainly where there is no finding and no
showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,'
the prohibitions cannot be sustained." Id. at 509, quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d
744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966). Although this holding deals specifically with the rights of
students to engage in symbolic speech within the school itself, teachers are mentioned
as retaining their First Amendment rights after passing through the "schoolhouse gate."
No reference was made to teachers' conduct outside the school. It certainly can be
inferred, however, that the "material and substantial" test would apply with equal if
not greater force to teachers' activities outside the "schoolhouse." See Russo v.
Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3551
(April 17, 1973), for a decision applying the Tinker rationale and reinstating a teacher
who had refused to recite the pledge of allegiance.
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of public employees follow the general pattern noticed in United States
Supreme Court decisions, gradually moving to a position which pro-
vides more complete protection for First Amendment freedoms. The
first California case in which a teacher raised a First Amendment de-
fense to a dismissal proceeding was Board of Education v. Swan.59
There the school board dismissed Mrs. Swan, a permanent teacher, for
alleged unprofessional conduct. She contended that the school board
fired her because she had testified before a Los Angeles County grand
jury investigating the school system and because she had pub-
licly criticized the school board. The California Supreme Court af-
firmed the trial court's rejection of this defense, holding that the school
board's "motives" were irrelevant as long as the board could prove that
Mrs. Swan had violated lawful school district regulations. 60
Since Swan, California decisions-like those of the United States
Supreme Court-reflect increasing judicial sensitivity troward protect-
ing the constitutional rights of public employees. 61 This sensitivity was
manifested initially in the 1962 decision of Board of Trustees v.
Owens.62 In Owens, a teacher was fired after he wrote five letters
to the local newspaper criticizing the educational process and local
school administrators. The official reason given for Owens's dismissal
was unprofessional conduct, but he alleged that the true reason was
the publication of the letters. The court of appeal viewed the basic
issue as "whether there had been any disruption or impairment of disci-
pline or the teaching process as a result of the defendant's letters.1
6 3
Finding no disruption or impairment, the court held that Owens could
not be dismissed.
Since Fort v. Civil Service Commission,64 decided two years af-
59. 41 Cal. 2d 546, 261 P.2d 261 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937 (1954).
60. The school board contended that Mrs. Swan had engaged in unprofessional
conduct when she failed to report for teaching assignments, asked another teacher to
join a teacher's union, failed to attend meetings called by the superintendent, dismissed
students five minutes early, suggested in a written bulletin that teachers have duplicate
keys made, and called the superintendent and board derogatory names before a parents
and teachers association meeting. All of these actions allegedly were examples of
unprofessional conduct because they violated regulations of the school district. 41
Cal. 2d 546, 549-50, 261 P.2d 261, 263-64 (1953).
61. See text accompanying notes 26-58 supra. See also Laguna Beach Unified
School Dist. v. Lewis, 146 Cal. App. 2d 463, 304 P.2d 59 (1956) (teacher dismissed
for unprofessional conduct after distributing pamphlets opposing the Korean War and
urging young men to resist the draft); Board of Educ. v. Wilkinson, 125 Cal. App. 2d
100, 270 P.2d 82 (1954) (teacher dismissed for refusing to testify before a legislative
committee investigating communists).
62. 206 Cal. App. 2d 147, 23 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1962), noted in 15 HAsniNos L".
360 (1964).
63. Id. at 157, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
64. 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964).
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ter Owens, the issue of whether a California public employee's chal-
lenged behavior affects his job performance has been the central focus
in public employee termination cases. Fort's service as chairman of
a local speakers committee working to re-elect then Governor Edmond
G. Brown violated a section of the Alameda County Charter which
prohibited any political activity by Alameda civil servants. The su-
preme court acknowledged that the county could restrict certain politi-
cal acts, but delineated two guides which must be followed in drafting
such restrictions. First:
The more remote the connection between a particular activity
and the performance of official duty the more difficult it is to
justify the restriction on the ground that there is a compelling pub-
lic need to protect the efficiency and integrity of the public serv-
ice. 65
Second:
Even if a comepling state purpose is present, the restriction must
be drawn with narrow specificity. 66
Applying these guides, the court ruled that the section of the charter
was "too broad and vague" and "would amount to a coercive restraint
on free speech .... "67
Two years after Fort, the supreme court further elaborated the
standards controlling the government's power to impinge upon the con-
stitutional freedoms of public employees. In Bagley v. Washington
Township Hospital District,68 the court distilled from prior case law
a three-pronged test by which the legality of governmental restrictions69
upon public employees' rights could be judicially measured: (1) The
political restraints must rationally relate to the enhancement of the pub-
65. Id. at 338, 392 P.2d at 389, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 339, 392 P.2d at 390, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 630; accord, Kinnear v. City
of San Francisco, 61 Cal. 2d 341, 392 P.2d 391, 38 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1964); Belshaw
City of Berkeley, 246 Cal. App. 2d 493, 54 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1966).
68. 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966).
69. In Bagley, the terminated employee had worked as a nurse's aide. While
participating in a campaign to recall her superiors, she and other workers had received
a memorandum from the directors of the district which stated in part that "any politi-
cal activity for or against any candidate or ballot measure pertaining to the . . .Dis-
trict is unlawful and will not be acceptable conduct for an employee of this hospital
.... " ld. at 502, 421 P.2d at 412, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 404. This memo also referred
to a section of the California Government Code which provided that: "No officer or
employee whose position is not exempt from the operation of a civil service personnel
or merit system of a local agency shall take an active part in any campaign for or
against any candidate, except himself, for an office of such local agency, or for or
against any ballot measure relating to the recall of any elected official of the local
agency." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3205 (West 1966). Both of these restrictions were
held invalid under the tripartate test formulated by the court.
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lie service. (2) The benefits which the public gains by the restraints
must outweigh the resulting impairment of constitutional rights. (3)
There must be no available alternative less subversive of constitutional
rights.
70
This flexible test has been employed by the courts to protect both
the legitimate interests of public employers and the individual liberties
of their employees.71 For example, the Bagley rationale was funda-
mental to a unanimous 1969 decision of the California Supreme Court
which permitted the circulation of signature petitions related to public
school financing by teachers during their lunch hours. The school
board had contended in Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles
City Board of Education72 that the proposed petitioning would ham-
per the functioning of the school and would distract teachers from their
planning work. But the court rejected this contention because the pro-
posed petitioning demonstrated no threat to "order and efficiency in
the schools."'73  Therefore, the First Amendment rights of the teachers
could not legitimately be circumscribed.
The Fort and Bagley guidelines have proven useful primarily
where the attack on First Amendment liberties is apparent; but the
guidelines nevertheless could be circumvented by an employer who
70. 65 Cal. 2d at 501-02, 421 P.2d at 411, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 403 (1966); accord,
Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623
(1967); Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal. 2d 559, 421 P.2d 697, 55 Cal. Rptr. 505
(1967).
71. Compare Norton v. City of Santa Ana, 15 Cal. App. 3d 419, 93 Cal. Rptr.
37 (1971) (upholding police department rules and regulations requiring good conduct
from a police officer); Akin v. Board of Educ., 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr.
557 (1968) (permitting the expulsion of an hirsuite high school student where it was
shown that his beard definitely would disrupt the educational process); Hollon v.
Pierce, 257 Cal. App. 2d 468, 64 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1967) (denying reinstatement to a
school bus driver whose religious beliefs indicated that he could not be trusted with
his passengers' safety); and Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d
867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (justifying suspension and expulsion of university stu-
dents for protesting in violation of reasonable university regulations) with City of
Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970)
(overturning as violating the Fourth Amendment sections 3600-704 of the California
Government Code which required public disclosure of financial investments by all
public officers and political candidates); Hofberg v. County of Los Angeles Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 258 Cal. App. 2d 433, 65 Cal. Rptr. 759 (1968) (requiring civil service
eligibility for a potential social worker denied same for pleading the Fifth Amendment
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities); Ball v. City Council, 252
Cal. App. 2d 136, 60 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1967) (reinstating a police chief dismissed for
his organizing activities); and Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d
189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967) (reinstating a teacher dismissed from his high school
teaching position for wearing a beard).
72. 71 Cal. 2d 551, 455 P.2d 827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
73. Id. at 565, 455 P.2d at 836, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
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concealed the true reason for terminating an employee behind coun-
terfeit charges. By requiring administrative and judicial findings on
an employer's true motivation for dismissing an employee when that
motivation is at issue, Bekiaris is the first California decision which
shields public employees from such disguised attempts to subvert the valid
exercise of First Amendment freedoms.
Procedure: Creating Adequate Procedural
Safeguards for Probationary Teachers'
First Amendment Rights
Prior to Bekiaris, the California courts uniformly had held that a
public employer's motives were irrelevant where he had legal grounds
to terminate his employee. 74  In refusing to examine an employer's mo-
tives for terminating an employee, the courts relied on three concepts.
First, as discussed above, the notion that public employment is a privi-
lege rather than a right discouraged judicial scrutiny of public em-
ployee terminations. 7 ' Related to the privilege doctrine was the con-
cept that public employment is a mere variant of private employment.
Just as a private employer is not legally obligated to retain an employee
whose political activities are offensive, by analogy a public employer
also was considered free to terminate employees at will.76 Third, the
74. Board of Educ. v. Swan, 41 Cal. 2d 546, 555, 216 P.2d 261, 267, cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 937 (1953) (permanent school teacher terminated); Neuwald v.
Brock, 12 Cal. 2d 662, 675-76, 86 P.2d 1047, 1053 (1939) (agricultural investigator
terminated for allegedly unsatisfactory work and conduct); Kennedy v. State Personnel
Bd., 6 Cal. 2d 340, 344, 57 P.2d 486, 488 (1936) (attorney terminated for allegedly
unsatisfactory service); Livingston v. MacGillivray, 1 Cal. 2d 546, 558, 36 P.2d 622,
628 (1934) (County Water Dept. foreman's job "abolished"); Neely v. California
State Personnel Bd., 237 Cal. App. 2d 487, 493-94, 47 Cal. Rptr. 64, 69 (1965) (ref-
eree charged with discourtesy and inefficiency); Monahan v. Department of Water
and Power, 48 Cal. App. 2d 746, 754, 120 P.2d 730, 734 (1941) (county employee's
challenge to job classification system rejected by court). This position was actually an
application of the tort concept that "bad motives" are irrelevant where there is a
legal right to act in a particular manner. For a general critique of the application of
this concept to tort cases in general, see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 24-26 (4th ed.
1971).
75. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
76. See, e.g., People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 175-76, 108 N.E. 427, 434 (1915)
(Bartlett, C.J., concurring). "The state, an incorporeal master, speaking through the
legislature, communicates the resolve [as to the character of its employees] to its agents
by enacting a statute. Either the private employer or the state can revoke the resolve
at will. Entire liberty of action in these respects is essential unless the state is to be
deprived of a right which has heretofore been deemed a constituent element of the re-
lationship of master and servant, namely the right of the master to say who his
servants shall (and therefore shall not) be."
For a general discussion of the power which private employers hold over their
employees' exercise of constitutional freedoms and a suggestion, interestingly enough,
1244 [Vol. 24
TEACHERS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
courts traditionally have been reluctant to inquire into areas of ad-
ministrative decision-making unless the decision is patently illegal or
unjust.7
7
The previous discussion of the development of guidelines to pro-
tect the First Amendment rights of public employees"8 indicates that
the reasons for refusing to examine a public employer's motives are
no longer tenable. The reluctance of administrative and judicial bodies
to scrutinize a public employer's motives for terminating an employee
had fashioned a loophole in the constitutional protections of public
employees. In closing the "motive loophole," 79 the court in Bekiaris
outlined a series of administrative and judicial procedures which must
be followed whenever a probationary teacher attempts to show that
his employer's motives were constitutionally improper. The court held
that evidence offered by the teacher at the administrative hearing must
be received substantively and findings made concerning it. The court
continued:
If it is found by the board that the reason for dismissal was not
the causes stated in the accusation but rather was official dissatis-
faction with the teacher's exercise of constitutional rights, the board
should order reinstatement unless it further determines that the
consequent limitation on these rights is justified by a compelling
public interest. If the board finds that the reason for dismissal
was the causes stated in the accusation and was not official dis-
satisfaction with the teacher's exercise of constitutional rights, it
should enter a finding to that effect. If the board finds that the
reason of dismissal was both the causes stated in the accusation
and official dissatisfaction with the teacher's exercise of constitu-
tional rights, it should make a finding to that effect and further
that a tort action may lie where a private employer's "bad motives" injure his em-
ployee, see Blades, Employment tit Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967).
77. This judicial reluctance continues to manifest itself in the substantial evidence
rule. The uniqueness of California's independent judgment test in situations involving
fundamental, vested rights was pointed out in Newman, Foreward to W. DEERINo,
supra note 2 at xi (1970). In Board of Educ. v. Swan, 41 Cal. 2d 546, 261 P.2d 261
(1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937 (1954), Mrs. Swan asserted that the alleged viola-
tions of school regulations allegedly amounting to unprofessional conduct were not the
true reason for her termination, but rather that the charges were a "smoke screen" to
"get even" with her for testifying critically against the school board before a grand
jury investigating the school system. In deciding that the school board's motives were
irrelevant, the court refused to disturb the trial court's findings where Mrs. Swan's
termination had been sufficiently justified in the face of "conflicting evidence." Id.
at 556, 261 P.2d at 268.
78. See text accompanying notes 30-73 supra.
79. The Bekiaris holding specifically overruled the "motive" cases. See note 74
supra. The court said that "[s]ince the reason for the [motive rule] has been dis-
credited, the rule, too, must fall." 6 Cal. 3d at 588 n.7, 493 P.2d at 487 n.7, 100
Cal. Rptr. at 23 n.7.
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should determine whether, absent the exercise of constitutional
rights, it would dismiss the teacher.8 0
If the teacher is not satisfied with the board's ultimate decision,
he can obtain judicial review by filing for a writ of mandate with
the superior court. 8 ' The trial court must then "make an independent
assessment of established factual elements and determine whether the
true reason for dismissal was . . . official dissatisfaction with the teach-
er's exercise of constitutional rights, so that, absent the exercise of
these rights, the board would not have dismissed the teacher."8 2  The
court listed three possible conclusions the trial court could reach in
determining whether the writ of mandate should issue.
If it determines that question [whether the true reason for the
teacher's dismissal was official dissatisfaction with the teacher's
exercise of constitutional rights] in the negative and also finds
legal error in the record it shall deny the writ. If it determines
that question in the affirmative it should proceed to consider
whether or not the consequent limitation on constitutional rights
was justified by a compelling public interest. If it concludes that
it was not justifed [sic] by a compelling public interest it should
issue a writ of mandate requiring the Board to reinstate the teacher.
If it concludes that it was so justified it should deny the petition
for the writ.
83
If the teacher appeals the decision of the trial court, "the appel-
late court's scope of review is identical to that of the trial court except
that it shall uphold the determination of the trial court as to the reason
for dismissal if that determination is supported by substantial evidence
in light of the entire record."8 4
Like the Bagley test, 5 these procedures are flexible and attempt
to safeguard the requirements of the school system as well as the
rights of the individual teacher. By carefully pointing out that the
procedures would not prevent the termination of a teacher so long
as the primary reason for termination is not the school board's dis-
satisfaction with the teacher's exercise of constitutional rights, the court
sought to eliminate the danger that "a teacher about to be dismissed
for valid causes could insulate himself from dismissal simply by engag-
ing in political activities offensive to his superiors."6
Any educational system has a legitimate need, and is obligated
to the public, to provide the security of contractual or de facto tenure
80. Id. at 592-93, 493 P.2d at 491, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
81. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1094.5 (West 1955). See generally W. DEERING,
supra note 2.
82. 6 Cal. 3d at 593, 493 P.2d at 491, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 27 (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
86. 6 Cal. 3d at 593 n.12, 493 P.2d at 491 n.12, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 27 n.12.
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only to competent teachers. If a probationary teacher could immunize
himself against nonrenewal or dismissal by engaging in political activi-
ties known to be offensive to his superiors, he would enjoy de facto
tenure the moment he signed his initial contract. The careful proce-
dures outlined in Bekiaris reduce the danger of subterfuge by either
the school authorities or the probationary teacher. When this aspect
of the opinion is understood, the decision should be less objectionable
to local school boards and also should provide persuasive precedent
for courts and legislatures in other states to adopt similar procedures.
The Procedural Protection Afforded Probationary
Teachers in Other States
The administrative procedures contained in section 13443 of Cali-
fornia's Education Code, 7 designed to protect California probationary
teachers against unwarranted nonrenewal decisions, were enacted by
statute in 1965.8 Bekiaris has modified these basic procedures by
holding that a probationary teacher facing termination has a right
to present evidence to show that the true reason for termination was
the exercise of his constitutional rights, and that such evidence must
be received substantively and findings made concerning it. The Be-
kiaris procedures do not overburden California's school districts with
added institutional processes since the basic guidelines requiring ad-
ministrative hearings and judicial review were already in effect. Hence,
the supreme court easily eliminated the "motive loophole" by requiring
that additional findings be made at the administrative and judicial
review proceedings to which a nonrenewed probationary teacher al-
ready had a right.
In many states such thorough statutory procedures do not exist,
however. In addition to the fact that no state's procedures require
the type of findings outlined in Bekiaris, twenty-eight states fail to
provide any administrative safeguards against unconstitutionally moti-
vated nonrenewal decisions.80 Twelve states do furnish an opportunity
for a probationary teacher to learn the reasons why his contract was
87. See note 12 supra.
88. Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 1110, § 2, at 2755.
89. The twenty-eight states are Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Okla-
homa, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming. Most of these states do require that the teacher receive notice of non-
renewal by a certain date. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 125.17(3) (1960) (April 1 dead-
line); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 189:14-a (1964) (March 15 deadline). However,
statutorily prescribed notice requirements do not guard against unconstitutionally moti-
vated decisions arriving in the mail before the prescribed deadlines.
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not renewed;90 but a statement of reasons with no hearing can easily
represent a partisan explanation which the terminated teacher will not
be able to refute. Only six states in addition to California provide
for a hearing at which the probationary teacher can challenge the
nonrenewal decision, 91 even though such a formal hearing is the only
effective administrative forum in which to protest an allegedly uncon-
stitutional nonrenewal decision. Nonetheless, the procedures in these
six states, like the pre-Bekiaris procedures in California, fail to pro-
tect fully a nonrenewed teacher against covert attacks on his consti-
tutional rights.
The state courts which do not require that a nonrenewed proba-
tionary teacher receive a statement of reasons or a hearing have done
so on the ground that the absence of such procedural safeguards does
not offend the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.92  The ra-
tionale of the courts has been that they cannot create procedural rights
for probationary teachers which approximate those of permanent teach-
ers when the respective state legislatures distinguish between probation-
ary and permanent employment.93 A review of these state court deci-
sions makes obvious that greater administrative protections for proba-
90. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-259 (1956) (statement of reasons); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 14, § 748(a) (1953) (same); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-10 (1969)
(same); IND. STAT. ANN. § 28-4717 (1970) (same); KY. REV. STAT. § 161.750 (1971)
(same); LA. REV. STAT. § 17:442 (1963) (same); MICH. COMP. LAws § 38.83
(Supp. 1972) (notice of unsatisfactory work); Mo. REV. STAT. § 168.221(1) (Supp.
1973) (same); ORE. REV. STAT. § 342.513 (1971) (material reason); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 11-1108 (Supp. 1972-73) (unsatisfactory rating); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 13-43-9.1 (Supp. 1972) (informal private conference); Wis. STAT. § 40.41
(1966) (private conference). The state of Kansas requires that reasons be given by
school districts in cities of greater than 120,000 population. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-
5403 (Supp. 1972).
91. ALAS. STAT. § 14.20.175 (1971); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1245, 1246 (Supp.
1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 10-151(a) (Supp. 1973); IOWA CODE § 279.13 (1972);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-13-2 (1972); TEx. EDUC. CODE § 13.104 (1972). Four
states do not require a probationary period of service but do provide reasons and a
hearing for every teacher: NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1254 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
391.312 to .3197 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-38(2) (1971); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 28A.58.450 (1970).
92. E.g., People ex rel. Thomas v. Board of Educ., 40 Ill. App. 2d 308, 188
N.E.2d 237 (1963); DeCanio v. School Comm., 358 Mass. -, 260 N.E.2d 676
(1970); Pinto v. Wynstra, 22 App. Div. 2d 914, 255 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1964); Board
of Educ. v. Helsby, 64 Misc. 2d 473, 314 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1970); Shannon v. Board of
Educ., 199 Tenn. 250, 286 S.W.2d 571 (1955); Rees v. Murray City Bd. of Educ.,
6 Utah 2d 196, 310 P.2d 387 (1957). Cf. Whittington v. Barbour County Bd. of
Educ., 250 Ala. 692, 36 So. 2d 83 (1948); Zimmerman v. Board of Educ., 38 N.J. 65,
183 A.2d 25 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 956 (1963); Grace v. Board of Educ.,
32 Misc. 2d 983, 224 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1962).
93. See cases cited in note 92 supra.
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tionary teachers' constitutional rights are more likely to come through
state legislative reform than through litigation in state courtsY4
A strong argument can be made in favor of granting probationary
teachers statutory safeguards equal to those granted permanent teach-
ers. Legislatures in eight states which fail to provide a hearing for
nonrenewed probationary teachers do distinguish between dismissing
a probationary teacher during the school year and not renewing his
contract at the close of the year.05 In these eight states, only a pro-
bationary teacher who is dismissed during the school year is entitled
to many of the same administrative protections as a permanent teacher
who is dismissed during the school year or whose contract is not re-
newed. This distinction is based upon the view that a dismissal during
the year is more harmful to a probationary teacher's career than non-
renewal. Although the potential for harm undoubtedly is greater in
the case of dismissal during the year than in the case of nonrenewal,
it does not follow that nonrenewal is such a harmless event in a teach-
er's career that the teacher ought not to be afforded thorough proce-
dural protections. The current oversupply of teachers at every educa-
tional level in most parts of the nation 8 may well mean that the
94. Although state legislatures must bear the burden of formulating administra-
tive procedural protections, probationary teachers could litigate the constitutionality
of the nonrenewal decision in a state court as well as in a federal court. The de-
tailed determinations which California administrative agencies and trial courts must
make after Bekiaris could be promulgated by other state courts in order to ensure
careful consideration of the constitutional defenses raised by probationary teachers.
To date, however, Bekiaris is the only state appellate court decision which requires
such detailed determinations. See, e.g., Watts v. Seward School Bd., 454 P.2d 732
(Alas. Sup. Ct. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 921 (1970); Williams v. School Dist.
of Springfield, 447 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1969). Most of the decisions involving
the constitutional rights of probationary teachers have been litigated in federal courts.
See cases cited in notes 99-101 infra.
95. Three legislatures limit the causes for which a probationary teacher can be
dismissed during the year to those specifically outlined by statute as the causes for
which a permanent teacher can be dismissed: COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 123-18-11,
-16, -17 (Supp. 1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1420 (Supp. 1970); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 72-5406, 5407 (1972). The Massachusetts legislature requires the proced-
ures followed in dismissing a probationary teacher to be equivalent to those followed
in dismissing a permanent teacher: MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, § 42 (Supp. 1973).
The following four states require the utilization of the same causes and procedures in
dismissing probationary as well as permanent teachers: MN. STAT. § 125.17 (1960);
MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 75-6107 (1971); ORE. REv. STAT. § 342.530 (1971);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 21.1-160 (Supp. 1971).
96. A recent National Education Association Report says that teachers face the
worst job market since the Depression because the post-war baby boom has passed
through the nation's schools and the trend towards increasing school enrollments has
stopped. The report predicts a teacher surplus which will double by 1976 and which
will reach 100,000 to 150,000 annually unless new jobs are created. It notes that
15,000 to 35,000 experienced teachers who quit teaching now want to return to school
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stigma of nonrenewal will jeopardize a teaching career as much as
dismissal during the year does.
Even if other state courts choose not to follow the Bekiaris lead,
state legislatures should recognize the economic and social implications
of nonrenewal on a probationary teacher's career and should seek to
reduce unwarranted nonrenewal decisions by providing the same pro-
cedural safeguards for probationary teachers which already operate
to protect permanent teachers in their state from unwarranted termina-
tions. The additional expense and inconvenience incurred would be
slight in comparison to the possible harm inflicted on a fledgling teach-
er's career by nonrenewal.97
The Specific Federal Protection Afforded Probationary
Teachers' Constitutional Rights
During the past four years, probationary teachers frequently have
turned to the federal courts for protection from allegedly unwarranted
nonrenewal decisions of school administrators.9" The courts held the
jobs, and that the job outlook is also clouded by fiscal crises at the local school district
level which have resulted in the cutting back of educational programs and reducing the
size of teaching staffs. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1971, at 39, col. 1. See U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, MANPOWER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT: A REPORT ON MANPOWER REQUIRE-
MENTS, RESOURCES, UTILIZATION, AND TRAINING 170-74 (1970); Graybeal, Teacher Sur-
plus and Teacher Shortage, 37 EDUCATION DIGEST 13-6 (1972).
97. This fact was recognized recently by the North Dakota legislature. The
legislature prefaced a 1971 statutory amendment which requires a statement of rea-
sons and a hearing for any teacher who is to be dismissed during the year or whose
contract is not to be renewed with this statement of legislative intent. "The legislative
assembly, in recognition of the value of good employer-employee relationships between
school boards of this state and the teachers employed in the school systems, the need
to recruit and retain qualified teachers in this state, and further in recognition of the
many intangibles in evaluating the performance of individual members of the teach-
ing profession, urges that each school board of this state ensure through formally
adopted policies, that channels of communication exist between the board, supervisory
personnel, and teachers employed within its school system. It is the intent of the
legislative assembly that in the very sensitive area of discharge of teachers for cause
prior to the expiration of the term of the teachers' contracts, or in decisions not to
renew the contracts of teachers, that recognition be given by school boards to damage
that can result to the professional stature and reputation of such teachers, which stat-
ure and reputation were acquired only after the expenditure of substantial time and
money in obtaining the necessary qualifications for such profession and in years of
practicing the profession of teaching; and that in all decisions of school boards relating
to discharge or refusal to renew contracts, all actions of the board be taken with con-
sideration and dignity, giving the maximum consideration to basic fairness and de-
cency." N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-38(1) (Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
98. Probationary teachers file complaints against school administrations under
the 1871 Civil Rights Act, now 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) which provides: "Every
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, or
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
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fact of probationary status irrelevant in most of the cases where proba-
tionary teachers charged that their First Amendment rights had been
abridged.9" However, probationary status was held highly relevant
when they asserted Fourteenth Amendment claims based on alleged
due process deficiencies in administrative procedures. Some federal
courts rejected entirely the due process claims of probationary teach-
ers,100 while other courts differed on what procedures state educational
systems were required to follow in order to comply with due process. 101
Recently, in Board of Regents v. Roth'0 2 and Perry v. Sinder-
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) held that section 1983 did not make
municipal corporations liable for damages. However, teachers who have been termi-
nated for unconstitutional reasons are entitled to the equitable remedy of reinstate-
ment; back pay (diminished by earnings during the interim) has been held to be
an integral part of that equitable remedy. Horton v. Lawrence County Bd. of
Educ., 449 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1971); Ramsey v. Hopkins, 447 F.2d 128 (5th Cir.
1971) (per curiam); Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971).
99. E.g., Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408
U.S. 564 (1972); Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1970); Sindermann v.
Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970), affd, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pred v. Board of
Pub. Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287
(7th Cir. 1968); Hopkins v. Board of Educ., 330 F. Supp. 555 (N.D. Ill. 1971);
Roberts v. Lake Cent. School Corp., 317 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Jones v.
Battles, 315 F. Supp. 601 (D. Conn. 1970). Cf. Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist.,
435 F.2d 1182, 1186 (1st Cir. 1970) (dictum), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971);
Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153, 1159 (8th Cir. 1969) (dic-
tum); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003
(1967); James v. West Va. Bd. of Regents, 322 F. Supp. 217 (S.D. W. Va.), affd,
448 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1971); Abel v. Gousha, 313 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. Wis. 1970);
Albaum v. Carey, 283 F. Supp. 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Contra, Jones v. Hopper, 410
F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970); Schultz v. Palmberg,
317 F. Supp. 659 (D. Wyo. 1970); Bonner v. Texas City Independent School Dist.,
305 F. Supp. 600 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
100. E.g., Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
943 (1972); Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969).
101. One circuit required school districts to give a nonrenewed probationary
teacher a statement of reasons for his termination: Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist.,
435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971); Dunham v. Crosby.
435 F.2d 1177 (1st Cir. 1970). Another circuit required both a statement of reasons
and a hearing where there was either an asserted constitutional claim or an expectancy
of re-employment: Thaw v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 432 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1970);
Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1970); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d
852 (5th Cir. 1970). Yet another circuit required educational employers to give
nonrenewed probationary teachers both a statement of reasons and a hearing: Shirck
v. Thomas, 447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971), vacated, 408 U.S. 940 (1972); Roth v.
Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
102. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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mann,10 3 the United States Supreme Court examined the relevance
of a teacher's"0 4 probationary status to a federal cause of action. The
Court held in Sindermann that the right of a probationary teacher
to assert a First Amendment claim is not affected by probationary
status. 105 However, the Court took what appears to be an unfortu-
nately restrictive view of the due process clause and ruled that only
those probationary teachers who can demonstrate an objective property
interest or a recognized liberty interest are entitled to the court-ordered
protection of a statement of reasons for termination and a hearing. 1°6
The Roth and Sindermann decisions provide some protection against
unjustified nonrenewals for those probationary teachers who either can
successfully litigate a First Amendment claim or have what the Court
considers to be a recognized liberty or property interest entitling them
to due process administrative protection. But these decisions fail to
protect fully a fledgling teacher's First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. 0 7  Consequently, they fail to preserve the full value of freedom
of expression for educational institutions.10 8
103. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
104. Although both Roth and Sindermann held positions in state college sys-
tems, it is clear that the Court's opinions apply with equal force to secondary school
teachers. Shirck v. Thomas, 447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971), vacated, 408 U.S. 940
(1972).
105. Id. at 596.
106. 408 U.S. at 573, 577-78; 408 U.S. at 603. There are at least three reasons
for believing that the type of court-imposed hearing envisioned in Roth and Sinder-
mann may not result in great practical benefit for the terminated probationary
teacher. First, a probationary teacher is entitled to a hearing only after he has proved
the existence of a recognized liberty or property interest in federal court. He is not
entitled to a pretermination hearing, and there may be a considerable time lag be-
tween the termination and the hearing. Second, a teacher who proves that a recog-
nized liberty interest has been injured must then have an opportunity "to refute the
charge before University officials" in order to "clear his name." 408 U.S. at 573 & n.
12. Even if he succeeds in clearing his name, the university still "remain[s] free to
deny him future employment for other reasons." Id. n.12. See text accompanying
notes 134-136 infra for other difficulties presented to the probationary teacher by the
Court's conception of liberty. Third, a teacher who proves that he has a protected
property interest only "obligate[s] college officials to grant a hearing . .. where he
could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and challenge their sufficiency."
408 U.S. 593, 603. This seems to imply that there is a presumption of constitutionality
which the teacher has the burden of overcoming. In neither Roth nor Sindermann
does the Court precisely state when due process requires a probationary teacher to be
reinstated. See Van Alstyne, The Supreme Court Speaks to the Untenured: A Com-
ment on Board of Regents v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann, 58 A.A.U.P. BULL. 267
(1972) for a more thorough discussion of these practical problems.
107. See note 106 supra and text accompanying notes 133-140 infra.
108. See text accompanying notes 141-145 infra.
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Board of Regents v. Roth
In Roth, a nontenured state university professor who had taught
for one year alleged that his contract was not renewed because of
his exercise of First Amendment rights in criticising the university
administration. He contended further that the nonrenewal decision
denied him procedural due process since the university gave him nei-
ther a statement of the reasons for his nonrenewal nor a hearing.
The district court refused to decide the validity of Roth's First
Amendment allegation until a trial elicited more facts, but it granted
a summary judgment on the due process claim against the university
for failing to provide Roth with a statement of the reasons for his
nonrenewal and a hearing. 10 9 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment, stating in
part that these two due process safeguards were necessary both as
"a prophylactic against non-retention decisions improperly motivated
by exercise of protected rights"1 0 and also to protect Roth's future
employment opportunities. 1
On certiorari, the Supreme Court took a more restrictive view
of the scope of Fourtheenth Amendment protection. Justice Stewart,
writing for a majority of four justices, reversed the lower courts
and held that Roth had demonstrated neither an interest in the type
of liberty nor an interest in the type of property which the Fourteenth
Amendment would protect.11  While proclaiming that any definition
of liberty must be "broad indeed," Justice Stewart said that the record
did not indicate that the university made "any charge . . . that might
seriously damage [Roth's] standing and associations in his commu-
nity," such as that he was dishonest or immoral." 3  In addition, the
109. 310 F. Supp. 972, 983 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
110. 446 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1971).
111. Id. at 809.
112. 408 U.S. at 579. The Court's examination of what type of liberty or prop-
erty interests the due process clause would protect marked a significantly different
approach from that taken by earlier circuit court decisions. See notes 99-101 supra.
The circuit courts relied on Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961), and balanced the interests of the individual teacher against those of the school
system in determining what procedures were necessary to satisfy due process. The
differing degrees of importance which the circuits assigned to a school system's interest
in firing an incompetent teacher as opposed to the teacher's interest in being exempt
from an arbitrary decisions denying renewal resulted in three positions: no due proc-
ess procedures; a statement or reasons; or a statement of reasons plus a hearing.
Assuming that an employee does not have a First Amendment claim to litigate, the
Court's rejection of this balancing process in favor of attempted definitions of pro-
tected liberty and property interests means that a public employee who can demon-
strate neither an objective property interest in his job nor an injured liberty interest in
seeking another job may be denied renewal without a statement of reasons or a hearing.
113. 408 U.S. at 572, 573.
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record did not indicate that the univeristy's failure to renew his con-
tract "imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed
his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities."
114
Thus, Justice Stewart concluded that it would stretch "the concept
[of liberty] too far to suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty'
when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before
to seek another."' "
In the Court's view, the record also failed to demonstrate that
Roth had suffered any injury to a protected property interest. An
examination of his contract, relevant state statutes, and college rules
revealed that he had at most an "abstract need or desire" for his
job, not a "legitimate claim of entitlement to it."" 6 Accordingly,
the Court held that it was error to grant summary judgment against
the university for its failure to provide Roth with reasons and a hear-
ing.
1 7
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas rejected the Court's re-
stricted view of the scope of due process protection. For three reasons,
Justice Douglas would have granted district courts the discretion to
require that educational systems give reasons and a hearing to nonre-
newed probationary teachers such as Roth. First, whenever a viola-
tion of First Amendment rights is alleged, "the reasons for dismissal
or for nonrenewal of an employment contract must be examined to
see if the reasons given are only a cloak for activity or attitudes pro-
tected by the Constitution."'" 8  Second, nonrenewal should be treated
as a more serious threat to a teacher's career than the majority was
willing to concede. "Nonrenewal of a teacher's contract is tantamount
in effect to a dismissal and the consequences may be enormous. Non-
renewal can be a blemish that turns into a permanent scar and effec-
tively limits any chance the teacher has of being rehired as a teacher,
at least in his State.""' 9  Third, and as a consequence of these two
substantive reasons, Justice Douglas saw practical advantages in es-
tablishing a procedure which would provide the teacher with an oppor-
tunity to rebut the reasons given for his nonrenewal before there is
a trial on the merits of any First Amendment claim. Such a proce-
dural approach is the only "means short of a lawsuit to safeguard
the right not to be discharged for the exercise of First Amendment
guarantees,' 120 and is the most functional way of handling such dis-
114. Id. at 573.
115. Id. at 575.
116. Id. at 577.
117. Id. at 579.
118. Id. at 582 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
120. Id.
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putes. "'School-constituted review bodies are the most appropriate
forums for initially determining issues of this type, both for the con-
venience of the parties and in order to bring academic expertise to
bear in resolving the nice issues of administrative discipline, teacher
competence and school policy, which so frequently must be balanced
in reaching a proper determination.' "121 Justice Douglas's dissent,
in contrast to Justice Stewart's majority opinion, is less concerned with
conceptual refinements of liberty and property and, like Bekiaris, is
greatly concerned with providing a probationary teacher effective pro-
cedural protection against unconstitutionally motivated nonrenewal de-
cisions.1 2a
Justice Marshall also dissented. Although he agreed with Jus-
tice Stewart's analytical framework, he would have been more liberal
in defining the terms "property" and "liberty." In his view, "every
citizen who applies for a government job is entitled to it unless the
government can establish some reason for denying the employment."'
23
Thus, every citizen who applies for a government job has a property right
to that job. The citizen also has a liberty interest in the job-the lib-
erty to work. Refusal by a public employer to state the reasons why
the citizen did not receive the job denies constitutionally guaranteed
protection to both these interests. Because "procedural due process
. . . is our fundamental guarantee of fairness, our protection against
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable government action,"'24 the
due process clause should require the government to "say why [an
application for public employment is denied or the contract of a gov-
ernment employee is not renewed], for it is only when the reasons
underlying government action are known that citizens feel secure and
protected against arbitrary government action."'1 25  In rejecting the
argument that requiring a government employer to provide a statement
121. Id. at 586, quoting Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 944-45 (5th Cir.
1970), aff'd, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
122. It should be noted, however, that the district court opinion quoted approv-
ingly by Justice Douglas requires the nonrenewed teacher to demonstrate that the
stated reasons were "wholly inappropriate as a basis for decision" or "wholly without
basis in fact" before the university had to justify its decision. 408 U.S. at 586
quoting 310 F. Supp. 972, 980. In contrast, the California Supreme Court in Beki.
aris appears to require only that a teacher show that unconstitutional motives were
the predominant reason for termination. "If the board finds that the reason for dis-
missal was both the causes stated in the accusation and official dissatisfaction with
the teacher's exercise of constitutional rights, it should make a finding to that effect
and further should determine whether, absent the exercise of constitutional rights, it
would dismiss the teacher." 6 Cal. 3d at 593, 493 P.2d at 491, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
See text accompanying note 78 supra.
123. 408 U.S. at 588 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 589.
125. Id.
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of reasons for denying a particular job would "cripple" the government,
Justice Marshall argued that "[i]t is only where the government acts
improperly that procedural due process is truly burdensome."'12 6 More-
over, Justice Marshall viewed the due process clause as requiring a




The companion case to Roth, Perry v. Sindermann,128 involved
a "probationary" teacher who had taught for ten years in a state college
system which did not operate with an official tenure program. Sin-
dermann alleged that the decision not to renew his contract was
prompted by displeasure with his public criticism of the college's re-
gents, and that the failure to provide him with a statement of the
reasons for his nonrenewal and a hearing at which he might rebut
the reasons stated violated the due process clause. The Fifth Circuit
disagreed with the trial court which had granted summary judgment
in favor of the college and held that Sindermann could state both a federal
cause of action based on a First Amendment claim and a Fourteenth
Amendment claim on the theory that he had been deprived of a prop-
erty interest in continued employment. 29 Writing again for the same
majority as in Roth, Justice Stewart affirmed the First Amendment
claim 30 but rejected the Fourteenth Amendment claim to the extent
that it was predicated on a purely subjective expectancy interest."' But
if Sindermann could demonstrate a sufficient property interest by show-
ing the existence of an objective set of institutional practices amounting
to "an unwritten 'common law' . . . that certain employees shall have
the equivalent of tenure," the Fourteenth Amendment would require
an administrative hearing "where he could be informed of the grounds
for his nonretention and challenge their sufficiency.""' 2
126. Id. at 591.
127. Id. at 590.
128. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
129. 430 F.2d 939, 942-44 (5th Cir. 1970), afj'd, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
130. 408 U.S. at 596.
131. Id. at 603.
132. Id. at 602. Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion to Roth and Sinder-
mann may provide insight into the way some federal courts will now apply the Four-
teenth Amendment in relation to terminated probationary teachers. Failing to mention
a way in which such a teacher might be able to show injury to his liberty interest, the
Chief Justice concentrated upon what types of asserted property rights the Fourteenth
Amendment protects. He stated that in order to determine whether a recognized prop-
erty right exists, a federal court must look to the existence of "either an express or an
implied contract" under relevant state law. Id. at 604 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
If the state law is uncertain, then he suggested that district courts abstain and permit
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Criticism of Roth and Sindermann
It is submitted that the majority's restrictive understanding of what
property and liberty interests fall within the ambit of the Fourteenth
Amendment may unnecessarily hinder a probationary teacher's expres-
sion ot independent views, and consequently will harm the quality
of education. Such an understanding also signifies a retreat from
the Court's traditional concern for the First Amendment liberties of
teachers.
The majority's conception of property as an objective set of insti-
tutional practices which create an expectancy of re-employment would
provide hearings for only certain probationary teachers-only those
who can prove either that they worked at length in a system of de
state courts to resolve the issue of whether a teacher is entitled to a hearing. Id.
This approach to deciding when interests are "property" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment could cause problems for probationary teachers. A charitable view of
the Chief Justice's opinion would be that he was unaware that state court cases inter-
preting due process requirements have never provided any procedural protections for
terminated probationary teachers in the absence of a specific statute or express contract.
See note 92 supra.
Increased protection for probationary teachers' "expectancy interests," or implied-
in-fact contracts, has come only through the federal courts' interpretation of the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947), was the first case which used the term "expectancy of
continued employment" in the context of a probationary teacher. There, Judge
Learned Hand ruled that a probationary teacher who had been terminated for her
service on a federal jury could base a federal complaint on what is now section 1983 of
the 1871 Civil Rights Act. Judge Hand held that the teacher's termination "may have
been the termination of an expectancy of continued employment, and that is an injury to
an interest which the law will protect against invasion by acts themselves unlawful, stch
as the denial of a federal privilege." Id. at 139. This concept of a protected expec-
tancy interest was used again in the Fifth Circuit cases cited in note 99 supra, and its
meaning has been partially clarified by the Roth and Sindermann majority opinions.
Chief Justice Burger's state-oriented approach to what interests are protected,
coupled with the general dearth of state statutory protection for probationary teachers,
would mean that in nearly every instance where a probationary teacher had no inde-
pendent First Amendment claim, he would be without procedural protection. Such an
approach toward determining protected property interests would undercut the majority's
"unwritten 'common law'" test of property and expose even more probationary teach-
ers to arbitrary nonrenewal decisions. The Roth and Sindermann majority does not
require lower federal courts to abdicate to state courts the task of determining
whether a protected property interest exists, even when the relevant state law is uncer-
tain. It nevertheless is clear that the majority considers the existence of protected
property interests an issue to be determined largely by examining relevant state law and
practices. 408 U.S. at 577 and 408 U.S. at 602 n.7. Chief Justice Burger's views are
representative, however, of a renewed interest by some members of the Court in ex-
panding the abstention doctrine. See, e.g., Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971)
(per curiam); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439-43 (1971) (Burger,
C.J and Blackmun, I., dissenting). But see Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan,
406 U.S. 498 (1972).
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facto tenure or that they were not renewed at the last moment before
acquiring tenure. However, many neophyte teachers will never be
able to demonstrate the type of property interest contemplated by the
Court and hence may not be renewed without benefit of a statement
of reasons or a hearing.
Even though the Court's contention that a recently hired pro-
bationary teacher has no Fourteenth Amendment property right in
his job can be logically justified,' 33 a reasonable understanding of the
concept of liberty would require procedural protections for all proba-
tionary teachers. The majority's conception of liberty provides such
protection for only a few probationary teachers and is deficient for
two reasons. First, the majority's analysis of liberty focuses solely
on the manner in which the educational administration itself conveys
its nonrenewal decision to the teacher. According to Roth, unless
the administration denies renewal to a probationary teacher in a man-
ner which actually stigmatizes or embarrasses the teacher so that his
future employment opportunities would be jeopardized, the probation-
ary teacher's liberty interest is not deemed to be affected. Therefore,
so far as procedural due process is concerned, an educational admin-
istration which wishes not to renew a probationary teacher is not re-
quired to state reasons for its decision; or it may proffer innocuous
"official" reasons which mask the true motivation for the decision.
Second, the majority's assertion that a probationary teacher's lib-
erty interest is not affected by nonrenewal because he "remains as
free as before to seek another"'134 job seems inaccurate. As Justice
Douglas observed,13 5 procedural protections are required because non-
renewal may have enormous, lasting consequences on a teacher's car-
reer. As Justice Marshall stated,3 6 a probationary teacher's liberty
interest in working in the particular job which he currently holds is
by definition affected by a nonrenewal decision. The points raised
by each of these dissenters are especially accurate today since the teach-
ing market is glutted at all levels and is expected to remain so for
many years to come. 37  The majority's analysis of liberty is impervious
133. The central attack which can be made on the majority's conception of
property is one based upon policy. Justice Marshall's argument that every applicant for
a government position has a property interest in that job obviously is based on a dif-
ferent perception and evaluation of the policy factors. Justice Marshall goes even
further than Charles Reich did in evaluating what constitutes government-created
property. See, Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 734-37 (1964). See gen-
erally Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1081
(1968).
134. 408 U.S. at 575.
135. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
136. See text accompanying notes 123 & 124 supra.
137. See note 96 supra.
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to the probable economic hardship in locating another teaching job
after nonrenewal. In light of the current surplus of teachers, the ma-
jority should have recognized that all probationary teachers have a
very fundamental liberty interest which is jeopardized by a nonrenewal
decision. Instead, the Court has suggested a definition of liberty under
which only those probationary teachers who have been officially stig-
matized by an educational administration will be safeguarded from
arbitrary or capricious nonrenewal decisions.
The result of the majority's understanding of property and liberty
is that numerous probationary teachers who have no objective property
interest, who are not officially stigmatized, and who are not able to
litigate a First Amendment claim 138 appear to have no federal protec-
tion from wholly arbitrary, capricious nonrenewal decisions. In states
which do not provide effective procedural safeguards for probationary
teachers, the virtual closing of the federal courts to probationary teach-
ers may mean that more and more probationary teachers will "play
it safe" and avoid expressing any controversial ideas which might ran-
kle their superiors. This denial of access to federal courts represents
a potentially serious injury to the diversity of views which many new,
young probationary teachers might be expected to express in their
teaching as well as outside their classrooms. A teacher's probationary
years are the years when his teaching competency is examined, but
too often they are also the years when controversial teachers are weeded
out of the educational system by their more conventional superiors.
By failing to protect all probationary teachers, the Supreme Court
has failed to protect a diversity of view points'8 9 and, assuming that
such diversity is an ingredient of quality education, 4 ' excellence in
education may suffer markedly.
138. The amount of time it takes to obtain final disposition of a civil action
varies widely between judicial districts. Recently, the median amount of time from
filing to disposition in a district court has been nine months. However, in civil rights
actions with a trial the time interval has been a median of twenty-five months. 1971
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFIcE OF THE U.S.
COuRTS 296-97, Table CSa. If the judgment was appealed, the median time inter-
val from the filing of a complete record to the final disposition was 7.6 months. Id.
at 251, Table B4. Thus, a typical probationary teacher filing suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970), who has a trial and appeals, can anticipate waiting more than two and
one-half years. In crowded circuits, the delay will be longer. For many probationary
teachers, especially those who have families to support, this kind of delay would be
financially crippling and thus operates as an effective deterrent to engaging in activities
which might cause nonrenewal and hence litigation.
139. "Academic freedom would avail us little if those teachers most likely to exer-
cise it may be weeded out of the scholastic garden before they fall within the pro-
tective embrace of the tenure statutes." Frakt, Non-Tenure Teachers and the Consti-
tution, 18 U. KANs. L. REv. 27 (1969).
140. See Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High School and Freedom
of Expression, 39 GEo. WAsH. L Rav. 1032, 1049 (1971).
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In addition to these deleterious effects of the majority's restrictive
conceptions of liberty and property, the Roth and Sindermann deci-
sions represent a retreat from the Supreme Court's traditional concern
for the First Amendment liberties of all teachers. The Roth majority's
unwillingness to grant district courts the discretion to require proce-
dural protections for any probationary teacher who alleges a First
Amendment violation represents a failure to protect those rights as
fully as possible. In holding that Roth was not entitled to a statement
of reasons and a prior hearing where he "merely" alleged that his
First Amendment rights were abridged by the nonrenewal decision,
the majority argued that the Court had required prior administrative
hearings only in cases where the threat to First Amendment freedoms
was direct and immediate-such as where there was threatened an
injunction against a public gathering141 or a seizure of allegedly ob-
scene material.' 42
Justice Stewart thus suggested that the type of threat to First
Amendment freedoms alleged by Roth was only "indirect" and hence
not entitled to the same procedural safeguards required where the
threat is "direct." '43  The threat to First Amendment liberties may
in some cases be more apparent when a government agency declares
its intention to halt a public gathering or seize a quantity of literature
than when a teacher complains that he has been terminated for exer-
cising his rights of expression or assembly. But this "directness" dis-
tinction cannot be viewed as the pivotal issue in Roth; rather, the
majority and dissent appear to have differed on the basis of their
conflicting estimations of the value of free speech to educational insti-
tutions. Given an unshakable estimation of the value of First Amend-
ment liberties to the process of public education, there is every reason
to conclude with Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion in Roth that
whenever a teacher alleges that his exercise of free speech rights
has resulted in his nonrenewal, district courts ought to have the discre-
tion to require a particular educational unit to hold a hearing in order
to determine whether those allegations are true.'44 This position seems
141. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
142. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v. Search
Warrants of Property, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
143. 408 U.S. at 575 n.14.
144. The line of 5th Circuit decisions cited in note 99 supra, one of which was
Sindermann, required a hearing whenever a teacher asserted that his termination had
resulted from constitutionally impermissible reasons. In Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d
945 (5th Cir. 1970), the court stated: "If the board asserts a non-constitutional rea-
son and the teacher claims it is a sham and that the real reason is one impinging on
his constitutional rights, he must be afforded a hearing." Id. at 948. By requiring
that a probationary teacher prove his First Amendment claim at trial, Roth and
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especially appropriate in view of the Supreme Court's historical recog-
nition of the seminal role which free expression plays in educational
environments. 45
Conclusion
This note has focused primarily on the administrative and judicial
protections afforded the First Amendment rights of probationary teach-
ers. The protections which exist in California are among the most
progressive in the nation; with the elimination of the "motive loophole"
in Bekiaris,146 a California probationary teacher now ought to be
able to exercise vigorously his rights of speech and assembly. If
his contract subsequently is not renewed for unconstitutional reasons,
the Bekiars procedures, if conscientiously applied, will enable him
to obtain relief through state procedures. 4 r Unfortunately, many
other states do not provide any procedural safeguards against unwar-
ranted terminations of a probationary teacher's contract.,
48
The United States Supreme Court's restricted interpretation of
the due process clause in the Roth and Sindermann decisions means
that only three types of probationary teachers will be able to obtain
federal relief from unconstitutional nonrenewal decisions: one who
has an objective property interest; one whose character has been offi-
cially maligned so that his liberty in the community might be impaired;
and one who believes-and is prepared to litigate' 49-that his nonre-
newal was motivated by an animus to activities protected by the First
Amendment. Other probationary teachers will have no federal rem-
edy.1
5 0
Given the limited availability of procedural protections in many
states and the restricted scope of federal protection, there is a compel-
ling need for legislative reform of state statutes to provide greater
procedural protection against unconstitutionally motivated nonrenewal
decisions. Bekiaris v. Board of Education could serve as a model for
Sindermann overrule the possibility of using this line of decisions. 408 U.S. at 575
n.14 and 408 U.S. at 599 n.5.
145. E.g., "Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). "The vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools." Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
146. See text accompanying notes 74-79 supra.
147. See text accompanying notes 80-86 supra.
148. See text accompanying notes 89-97 supra.
149. See note 138 supra.
150. See text accompanying notes 102-140 supra.
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such reform. The well-reasoned opinion in that case outlines the most
effective procedures to date for protecting probationary teachers from
disguised as well as overt attacks on First Amendment freedoms.
Allan H. Keown*
* Member, Second Year Class.
Author's note: On June 25, 1973, the United States Supreme Court decided the two
cases mentioned in footnote 35. In United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 93 S. Ct. 2880 (1973), the Court reaffirmed the
Mitchell holding and again held that the Hatch Act provisions do not unconstitutionally
infringe on federal employees' First Amendment rights. It stated: "Although Congress
is free to strike a different balance [between the interest of the employee, as a citizen,
in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the government, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees] than it has . . . we think the balance it has so far struck is sustainable by
the obviously important interests sought to be served by the limitations on partisan po-
litical activities now contained in the Hatch Act." Id. at 2890. Similarly, in the com-
panion case of Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 93 S. Ct. 2908 (1973), the Court upheld the
validity of an Oklahoma statute regulating the political activity of state employees.
Thus, with these two decisions the Burger Court has again struck a balance in favor of
governmental power rather than individual freedoms. See California v. LaRue, 409
U.S. 109 (1972); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972).
Obviously, these two holdings invalidate this note's projection of "increasing judicial
sensitivity toward protecting the constitutional rights of public employees" contained
in the second section of the text. However, the analysis and criticism of the Roth
and Sindermann cases remains valid, and the exhortation to other state courts and
state legislatures to emulate the Bekiaris procedures contains even more urgency.
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